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ARE AGREEMENTS TO KEEP SECRET
INFORMATION LEARNED IN DISCOVERY LEGAL,
ILLEGAL, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN?
Susan P. Koniak*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For at least eight years before the public and government
authorities learned of the apparently dangerous combination of Ford
Explorer sport utility vehicles ("SUVs") and their Bridgestone/Firestone
brand of tires, Firestone had been settling lawsuits involving injuries and
deaths caused by their tires failing on Ford SUVs.' These settlements
included terms requiring the plaintiffs and their lawyers to keep quiet
about the settlements and about information learned through discovery,
including information that might have alerted the public or the
government to just how unsafe the Explorer/Firestone combination
actually was.2 In some cases, these secrecy provisions were reinforced

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am deeply indebted to Professor
Alan E. Garfield. His article Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1998), caused me to rethink the question of secrecy in litigation. Professor
Garfield did not intend his work to challenge the general acceptance of agreements to keep litigation
information secret, but one of the marks of truly good scholarship is that it has implications beyond
those foreseen by the originating author. In addition to Professor Garfield, whom I do not know, I
thank those whom I call on time and again to critique and help me with my work, two dear friends:
George M. Cohen and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. I also want to thank the participants at the Hofstra
Symposium in New York, my colleagues at Boston University and the editors of this review. I am
also indebted to Dora Lassalle, J.D. 2001, Boston University for her valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Editorial, Lessons from the Tire Fiasco, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 2000, at 178
[hereinafter Lessons]; Sealed Court Records Kept Tire Problems Hidden, USA TODAY, Sept. 19,
2000, at 16A [hereinafter Sealed CourtRecords].
2. See Sealed Court Records, supra note 1; see also Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects
Were Known in '96 But Not Reported, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Bradsher,
S.U.V. Tire Defects]; James V. Grimaldi, Recalls Spark Anti-Secrecy Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
2000, at F35; Matthew L. Wald & Keith Bradsher, Judge Tells Firestone to Release Technical Data
on Tires, N.Y. TIMES, SepL 28, 2000, at C2.
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by court protective orders issued upon joint application by both plaintiff
and defendant.3
To ensure silence before settlement was reached (i.e., during
discovery), the defendants in these cases either obtained court orders
requiring silence regarding information learned in discovery (often with
the tacit or explicit support of the plaintiffs' lawyers) or reached private
agreements with the plaintiffs and their lawyers, and entered stipulations
providing that both sides would keep quiet about matters learned in
discovery.4
It now appears that this silence worked to keep information from
both the public and the government that could have saved lives and
prevented devastating injuries. The Firestone/Explorer story finally
broke when some reporters obtained documents uncovered by these
earlier lawsuits-documents that were still protected by secrecy

3. See Lessons, supranote 1.
4. See id. These practices are alive and well and still being employed by Firestone, Ford and
the lawyers suing those companies. In June 2001, the district court with jurisdiction over the federal
cases pending against Ford and Firestone, which were consolidated and transferred to that court for
coordination of pretrial discovery, denied a motion brought by various news organizations to unseal
discovery material on the ground that the material was being kept secret pursuant to a private
agreement with which the court had no business interfering. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
198 F.R.D. 654, 657-58 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Given that the cases were transferred by court order and
often against the wish of the plaintiffs to the Indiana district court ostensibly to make discovery
more efficient, see In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. 1373, 2000 WL 33416573, at *2-3
(J.P.M.L. Oct. 24, 2000), and that the "private" agreement requiring secrecy had to be signed by
anyone wishing to share in that discovery, see In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 198 F.R.D. at 657, the
idea that the court was not involved in and indeed responsible for the continuing secrecy of
discovery information seems ridiculous. If you file a suit, you get transferred to Indiana by court
order so that you can participate in the joint discovery process, but you cannot participate in the
Indiana discovery without signing the "private" agreement. How "private" an arrangement is that?
Moreover, there are numerous class actions included in the Indiana consolidation. Judges
presiding over class actions are supposed to sit as fiduciaries for the absent class. See generally 7B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1791, 1797.1 (2d ed.
1986). The absent class is not available to make "private agreements." The court certainly has the
power under Rule 23 to mandate an end to secrecy, if it is not in the interests of the absent class. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). Even Arthur Miller, a general defender of the ability of parties and courts to
keep discovery information secret, has recognized that secrecy may be harder to justify in class
action cases. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427, 498 (1991). Absent class members, who may well have to make
decisions about whether to opt-out of any settlement reached, may well have no other reliable way
of learning about the strength of the class's claims than through newspaper reports detailing what
has been learned in discovery. The involuntary nature of the transfer in the name of making
discovery easier and the inclusion of numerous class actions in the consolidation seriously
undermine the Indiana court's position that the secrecy agreement was none of its affair.
5. See, e.g., Wald & Bradsher, supra note 2 ("Officials at the Department of Transportation
say the sealing of documents in settled lawsuits is one reason they did not spot the pattern of scores
of rollover deaths in Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires that failed.").
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agreements that Firestone, its lawyers, plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel, and
some judges had put in place.6
Put plainly, the documents were leaked to reporters in violation of
secrecy agreements and court orders. The leaked documents detailed,
among other things, how many tire-tread separations had been reported
to Firestone. They also described questions raised within Firestone and
Ford about the safety of the Explorer/Firestone combination.' Once
media accounts describing these documents were published, the
government began looking into the Ford/Firestone record,9 the public
demanded some response from the companies, and ultimately Firestone,
followed by Ford, instituted recalls of the tires on Explorer SUVs.0
From this sequence of events, it seems obvious that the secrecy
agreements and orders worked to delay the recall of these tires for years.
In those years, 271 people died in accidents linked to Explorer/Firestone
tire failure, and more than 800 people were seriously injured."
Newspaper, magazine, and television reporters have interviewed
the plaintiffs' lawyers who, on behalf of their injured clients, signed
secrecy pacts (on material obtained in discovery) or who had remained
quiet pursuant to court orders that they agreed not to contest. These
lawyers said more or less the same thing: their "first duty was to win as
much money as possible for the crash victims whom they represented."' 3
Plaintiffs' counsel said they did not disclose the pattern of failures of
Firestone Tires and Ford Explorer SUVs out of concern that their

6. See Keith Bradsher, Documents Show Firestone Knew of Rising Warranty Costs, N.Y.
TwrEs, Sept. 8, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Bradsher, Documents Show]; see also Keith Bradsher, 2
FirestoneStudies in 1999 Pointed to Tire Problems, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 2000, at A25; James V.
Grimaldi & Dina ElBoghdady, Early Signs Given of Tire Problems, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2000, at
El.
7. See Bradsher, DocumentsShow, supranote 6.
8. See id.
9. See U.S. to Investigate 21 Deaths Tied to Tires on Sport Utilities, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3,
2000, at C7; see also Editorial, Congress Takes Up Defective Tires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at
A30; Senate PanelPlans to Hold Tire Hearings,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,2000, at C5.
10. See Caroline E. Mayer & Carrie Johnson, Firestone to Recall More Tires: Agreement
Ends U.S. Probe of Accidents, WvASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at El; Cindy Skrzycki, Ford'sAction
Isn't Technically a Recall: No FederalForce Behind 'Notification',WASH. POST, May 23, 2001, at
A17; Cindy Skrzycki, 6.5 Million Tires Are Target of Recall: Firestone Unable to Conclusively
Explain Failures,WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2000, at Al; Matthew L. W'ald, Tread FailuresLead to
Recall of 6.5 Million Firestone Tires, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at Al.
11. See Class Action Status Given to Fordand FirestoneSuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001,
at C4 [hereinafter Class Action Status].
12. See generally Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects, supra note 2 (interviewing Sean Kane, as one
of the nation's top traffic-safety consultants, who identified problems with Firestone tires in 1996).
13. See id.
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clients' suits would be adversely affected;' 4 obviously they were
concerned about getting as much money as possible for their clients in
settlement. Secrecy was what the defendants demanded in exchange.
Ethics and litigation experts interviewed by the press have
explained that nothing in the ethics rules or other law prevented or
prevents these lawyers from doing just what they did. 5 Some of those
interviewed even went further, claiming, in effect, that ethically they had
to take the secrecy deal: "You're there to represent your client, not ...
the world, although you wish you could.... Ethically, there's no
question that you have to do what's in the best interest of the client.""
Is this true? Not quite. The American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct ("Model Rules") do not explicitly
address, and therefore might be said to allow, privately negotiated
secrecy agreements. 7 More important, the ethics rules that actually bind
lawyers-rules that often diverge from the ABA's Model Rules, most
notably on the issue of client confidentiality's--track the Model Rules in
this area, saying nothing explicit about secrecy deals. Nothing in the
ethics rules demands lawyers negotiate and sign such agreements.
Some states have already adopted laws restricting secrecy in civil
litigation'9 (and more states and the United States Congress have
recently considered such legislation"), but most jurisdictions in this

14. See id.
15. See id. (quoting expert on lawyer's ethics, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., who said
that the lawyers "had a civic responsibility the same as you or I do, but they didn't have a legal
duty' to report the tire problems").
16. Davan Maharaj, Firestone Recall Puts Spotlight on Secret Liability Settlements,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 2000, at 3A (quoting attorney Rowe Brogdon who represented
the parents of a person killed in a Firestone/Ford accident and who accepted a settlement on their
behalf requiring that discovery information be kept secret).
17. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
18. The ethics rules that operate as law in state and federal courts are, in almost all
jurisdictions, based on the ABA's Model Rules. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. ET AL., THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 15-16 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining the difference between the
Model Rules and the ethics rules adopted by state courts).
19. See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 2002); TEx.
R. CIV. P. 76(a). For a relatively complete list of the statutes and rules in the various states that
regulate the extent to which court records may be sealed or must be open, see ROSCOE POUND INST.,
MATERIALS OF SECRECY PRACTICES IN THE COURTS: STATE ANTI-SECRECY MEASURES 101-03

(2000) (on file with Author).
20. See, e.g., S.B. 1254, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999); H.B. 3239, 91st Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Il. 1999). The California bill is available for reconsideration in 2002. See Rebecca A.
Womeldorf & William S.D. Cravens, More Sunshine Laws Proposed, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 12, 2001 at
B14 (discussing introduction of sunshine statutes introduced in Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Tennessee, and the U.S.
Senate). The Illinois bill was introduced on January 10, 2001, and rereferred to Rules Committee on
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country operate under a prosecrecy legal regime. By that, I mean that the
majority of states and the federal government allow judges substantial
leeway to issue protective orders preventing parties from disclosing
information learned in discovery." And among those states which do
have laws restricting a judge's ability to issue such orders, very few have
laws that explicitly2 prohibit or restrict private agreements between the
parties to litigation to keep discovery material or the details of a
settlement secret.2
However, the fact that the current legal regime in most jurisdictions
operates to allow defendants, plaintiffs, and the courts to hide
information unearthed in lawsuits that might save lives does not make it
right. Indeed, any legal regime that facilitates the keeping of secrets as
lethal as the secrets Firestone was allowed to keep may be a legal regime
in need of serious repair. Certainly, the public is likely to feel that way,
and we insiders (by insiders I mean lawyers and judges), must recognize
the possibility that the system we have lived with for years, the system
we are comfortable with, may be just as perverse as our fellow citizens
seem to think it is.
I hasten to add that I am not arguing that the public's reaction to
our legal system is invariably filled with wisdom; I think it is not. Some
aspects of our legal system that offend the public, can, in my opinion, be
justified by principles that lawyers and judges understand and have a
duty to defend and preserve, no matter how unpopular or misunderstood
those principles may be to ordinary citizens. Moreover, I am not arguing,
nor do I believe, that life and limb must trump all other values. To say
that lives and limbs might well have been saved by another legal regime
does not end the argument for me. I say that not just because many
productive activities pose substantial risk to life and limb, but because
some principles are worth the sacrifice of lives and limbs.
Surely, once we understand that a legal regime is contributing to
the loss of life or the infliction of serious injury, it behooves us to make

April 6, 2001. See id.; see also Maharaj, supra note 16 (describing Senator Kohl's efforts to pass
federal legislation limiting secrecy in litigation).
21. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv.
457, 480; Miller, supranote 4, at 429.
22. I use the word "explicitly" on purpose to limit my assertion to laws that are specifically
directed at the parties to litigation. I mean to avoid any claim at this point about what other laws
(laws of more general application) say about such agreements.
23. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-18-401 (Michie Supp. 2001) (restricting the ability of
government lawyers to enter into agreements to keep litigation information secret); i. § 16-55-122
(restricting the ability of private parties to enter into agreements to keep litigation information secret
when that information involves an environmental hazard, but not otherwise).
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sure that the policies that justify that system make good sense. Here is
where the problem begins; I believe that the policies justifying the
current legal regime do not make sense, and that the current regime is
not supported by principle. Instead, it is supported by an unproven set of
assumptions about the benefits of the current regime in securing the
swift and efficient settlement of cases, and the costs of all other
models-models rarely delineated by those asserting the enormous costs
that these poorly described models would involve.' Such sloppy,
unsupported, overblown, justifications surely are insufficient to justify
the costs of the current regime, even if we assume those costs are limited
to the 271 deaths and over 800 injuries in the Firestone case alone.5
And, of course, there is no good reason to assume that the Firestone
costs are sui generis.2
Moreover, it is my position that the current regime is perverse not
only because of the casualty toll it allows. I will argue that the current
regime sets up perverse incentives to litigate cases, may encourage the
filing of frivolous suits, and encourages waste and inefficiency by
creating a market for information similar to the market that our
blackmail laws are designed to outlaw. In short, the supposed benefits of
the current regime, most notably: encouraging the swift and efficient
operation of our court system and supporting the nation's economic
productivity, are being touted without careful consideration of the
negative effects of the regime not just on lives and limbs, but on the
court system itself and on the efficient functioning of our economy.
II.

THE ACADEMIC DEBATE HAS FOCUSED ON THE WRONG QUESTION

The question of what our laws should allow and prohibit when it
comes to secreting information discovered in civil litigation has been
discussed rather thoroughly by legal scholars, generally by those who

24. See Miller, supranote 4, at 483.
25. See Class Action Status, supra note 11.
26. Although Arthur Miller makes a valiant effort (writing pre-Firestone) to forward the
position that there is little reason to think the prosecrecy regime we have lived with for some time
has caused much harm, see Miller, supra note 4, at 478-79, I find his argument unpersuasive. See
Daniel J. Wakin, Secrecy Over Abusive Priests Comes Back to Haunt Church, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12,
2002, at Al ("That approach [of a Roman Catholic diocese settling cases of sexual abuse by priests
and then sealing records], which is commonly used by many corporations and institutions in their
legal battles, has now come back to haunt the church, as diocese after diocese has acknowledged the
presence of priests accused of abuse within its ranks."); see also Editorial, A Moral Issue and a
Crime, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at B8; Dean E. Murphy, Connecticut Report Revisits Egan's
Role in Settling Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at B 1.
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write about either civil procedure 7 or legal ethics." By and large, that
literature precedes the Firestone tire debacle, which means that
defenders of secrecy did not have to face this particularly dramatic
example of how costly secrecy can be. However, the biggest problem
with the debate in the literature is not that it downplays how dangerous
to life and limb secrecy can be (although that is a flaw in some of the
articles). The real problem, as I see it, runs much deeper.
The debate has been conducted along the wrong fault line. What I
mean by that, is that most, if not all, of the participants in the debate,
whether they are prosecrecy or antisecrecy, seem to agree that the key to
the problem is understanding the true function of courts in society.29 In
other words, proponents of the current regime, as it exists in most states
and the federal system, begin by asserting that courts are designed to
resolve disputes between parties, not to disseminate information.
According to those in support of secrecy, because secrecy agreements
and secrecy orders tend to facilitate the prompt and efficient resolution
of suits, they should be welcomed and not viewed with suspicion.' They
further argue that antisecrecy supporters are wrong because they
fundamentally misconceive the true nature of courts.
On the other hand, those against secrecy seem to agree with the
prosecrecy advocates that the key question is the role courts play and are
meant to play in our society, although they disagree on what that role is
or should be.3 The antisecrecy camp demeans or at least downplays the
idea that courts are designed to aid private parties in the resolution of
27. See, e.g., Marcus, supranote 21; Miller, supranote 4.
28.

See, e.g., RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE

AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER AND GREED (1999); David Luban, Settlements and
the Erosionof the Public Realm, 83 GEo. LJ. 2619 (1995).
29. See Marcus, supranote 21 at 502. Professor Marcus notes:
There is no doubt that American judges, particularly federal judges, increasingly view
settlement promotion as an important objective. There are also valid grounds for
questioning this tendency in judicial activity, both because it can distort the proper role
of the courts and because it does not measurably increase the frequency of the
settlement.
IL (footnote omitted).
30. Professor Marcus continues:
The primary purpose for which courts were created, distinguishing them from other
organs of government, is to decide cases according to substantive law. The collateral
effects of litigation [making information available to the public] should not be allowed to
supplant its primary purpose.
Id. at 466-70 (footnote omitted); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 488 ("Courts are designed to
resolve disputes; they are not information ombudsmen.").
31. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 21, at 503; Miller, supranote 4, at 487.
32. See Miller, supranote 4, at 488.
33. See Luban, supra note 28, at 2648-58.
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their conflicts, arguing that our courts were designed primarily to serve
the public at large, not warring parties.' As institutions designed to
produce public goods such as court precedents, legal rules, and factual
accounts of contested events, and not private goods such as settlements,
court processes must be open.35 Otherwise, these public goods will be
underproduced.36
The antisecrecy advocates also dispute that sunshine in litigation
would be as disruptive to the goal of settling lawsuits as the prosecrecy
folks claim,37 but they primarily stand on other ground-precisely the
ground disparaged by the prosecrecy supporters-the ground that insists
that the true function of courts is something other than the resolution of
private suits. 3s As those who support secrecy would expect and are
waiting to find, those against secrecy also tend to criticize the system for
producing too many settlements, too quickly.39 The proponents of
secrecy emphasize the antisettlement comments of their opponents4 as
if those comments proved that criticizing the current regime meant one
was litigation crazy-just another ivory tower, egghead (probably
liberal), impractical, theory-driven (and not hallowed economic theory,
but some mushy "policy" driven kind). Consequently, this has become a
battle between the "real world, settlement-favoring, economic-minded
academics" and the "pie-in-the-sky, litigation promoting, mushy
theorists." Guess who's winning.
Back to the substantive point: I believe all of this fighting about the
true nature of courts and whether we have too many or too few
settlements is largely irrelevant to the question of whether the current
legal regime allowing secrecy is perverse. To prove this, I am going to
take the starting point of the prosecrecy advocates as my own. I am, in
other words, going to proceed by assuming that the primary (nearly sole)
purpose of courts is the efficient settlement of private disputes. I think
that position is wrong. It is entirely too simplistic an understanding of
the role the judicial system is designed to play and does in fact play in
our society. However, because the rightness or wrongness of this
34. See RICHARD A. ZrrRIN, ROSCOE POUND INST., WHAT JUDGES CAN AND SHOULD Do
ABOUT SECRECY IN THE COURTS 1 (2000); see also Luban, supra note 28 at 2648-58
(acknowledging that courts must play both roles, but nonetheless seeing the function of courts as
central to the question of how much secrecy should be allowed).
35. See Miller, supranote 4, at 485.
36. See Luban, supranote 28, at 2625.
37. See id. at 2655-56.
38. See id. at 2656.
39. See id. at 2621-22.
40. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 431-32.
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position matters so little to the issue of secrecy and information
discovered in litigation, I will adopt the "courts as private dispute
resolvers" model in its extreme form for the sake of argument. 41 My
claim is that this assumption does not justify the regime on secrecy in
litigation that now exists.

III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MY PosMON
First, it does not follow from the proposition that courts are
designed to facilitate the resolution of private disputes that they should
encourage, approve and allow any and all contractual promises that
make settlement more likely. In other words, it is surely the goal of
contract law to encourage the private formation of agreements, but that
does not mean that any and all contracts should be considered legal and
contract law does not consider all contracts legal. Central to my
argument is the proposition that agreements otherwise prohibited by law
(at least those prohibited for good reason by sound laws) should neither
be allowed nor encouraged merely because they facilitate settlements.
Indeed, unless the settlement context somehow removes the wrongs that
cause us to treat such agreements as illegal or unenforceable in other
contexts, the strong presumption should be that agreements otherwise
illegal or unenforceable should not be treated as legal and enforceable
merely because they were made in connection with litigation. That
presumption should only be abandoned when we are confident that
outlawing the settlement-connected secrecy agreements would have a
great enough effect on the number of settlements to outweigh whatever
dangers the laws against contracts for secrecy seek to prevent. Again, I
am assuming, for the sake of argument, that settling lawsuits is nearly an
unqualified good and the sole legitimate goal of judicial process.

41. Whether parties should be allowed to bargain over keeping the amount of the settlement
secret is a question that might require one to take a position on the public/private nature of courts to
answer. Whether or not that is true, what is true is that my analysis, which assumes the
information-to be kept secret-exists independently of the lawsuit cannot answer that question. On
the other hand, I am not persuaded it is a terribly important question. At least, I think it pales in
comparison to whether the law should allow parties to contract to keep discovery information secret,
the question this Article does address. Settlement amounts are, at best, ambiguous signals about the
existence of some "wrong" or "public danger." I am not sure that they provide much useful
information to anyone outside of future litigants and their lawyers. I am concerned with information
that is much more valuable; information gleaned in discovery. First, I will discuss information on
public dangers (crimes and torts) learned through discovery. I will then discuss trade secrets and
what I call intimate secrets (information protecting some legitimate zone of personal privacy)
learned in discovery. This Article will address the legality and sense of allowing private parties to
bargain to keep either of those forms of information secret.
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To make the position I have just set out more concrete consider the
following: would anyone say that our courts should encourage or allow
terms in settlement contracts that provided that the parties would later
cooperate in some criminal endeavor because such terms might make the
settling of some lawsuits easier? I assume not. My point is simple: To
assume that courts are designed solely to facilitate settlement does not
justify ignoring the existing divisions between right and wrong conduct
embodied in all of our other laws.42
Settlements are contracts regardless of whether they are entered
into by two private parties with no court involvement or whether they
are subject to court approval, as class action settlements and many
divorce and custody settlements usually are.43 Contract law has long
recognized that some contracts should be unenforceable either because
they are unconscionable" or are inimical to the public interest, i.e., void
as against public policy. 5 I will argue that there is no reason why
settlement contracts should be immune from challenges that would
defeat the validity of other contracts. Further, my position is not merely
limited to contract law. For example, a belief that courts should
encourage agreements that settle lawsuits should not be sufficient to
wipe out the goals embodied in criminal law, tort law, or any other part
of our larger legal corpus. People and entities who make certain
agreements, outside of the context of litigation, not only risk the voiding
of those agreements, but also risk the imposition of other sanctions:

42. For a general description of how the law treats contracts for secrets when they are made
outside of the litigation setting, see the excellent article by Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence:
Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1998). As the biographical
footnote to this Article acknowledges, it was Professor Garfield's article that allowed me to
reimagine the problem of secrecy in litigation. Professor Garfield, not I, deserves the credit for the
survey of the law on contracts for silence that I describe in the body of this article. What he did not
do was apply that law to contracts for secrecy in litigation. See id. He accepts the unspoken
assumption of the courts and other legal scholars that contracts for secrecy in litigation are somehow
outside the reach of all that other law and are subject to their own legal regime. See id. And why
not? As a practical matter, he is right. If the law is what courts do and say, then for some
inarticulated reason the law stops at the courthouse door. This Article examines that unspoken
assumption and concludes that the contrary position makes more sense, i.e., that the reasons for
treating promises for silence as legally suspect or unlawful is as strong, if not stronger, when those
promises are made in connection with litigation as they are when they are made in other settings.
43. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, The Lawlessness in Our Courts, 28 STETSON L. REV. 283, 294
(1998) (noting that class settlements are not binding without court approval, "which is supposed to
operate both as a check on collusion and as a substitute for individual assent to the
contract's terms").
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].

45. See, e.g., id. § 178.
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penalties, fines, and sometimes imprisonment.46 Why should those risks
be removed merely because the contracts are connected to a lawsuit? I
will argue that they should not.
Having stated where I am headed, the question becomes: How does
our law and how should our law, outside of the litigation context, treat
agreements to pay someone for remaining silent about another person or
entity's wrongful conduct, such as an entity's creation of an
environmental hazard, its production of a dangerous product, or its
perpetration of a fraud on large groups of people?47 The short answers to
these questions are that generally speaking, such deals are treated and
should be treated as legally void, i.e., unenforceable, and in some cases
they are and should be classified as criminal. 4' I will argue that we
should transfer our basically sound, if too lenient,49 approach to these
agreements from the nonlitigation context to the litigation context. Next,
we should strengthen those laws to make them more likely to be obeyed,
and we should adopt court procedures and practices that compliment the
interests those laws are designed to protect.
IV. THE WISDOM OF THE LAW ON PROMISING SILENCE
Most environmental hazards and virtually all frauds are not just
torts, they are also crimes. 50 The Model Penal Code and most state laws,
which draw on the Model Penal Code for inspiration, include the crime
of compounding: to "accept[] or agree[] to accept any pecuniary benefit
in consideration of refraining from reporting to law enforcement
authorities the commission or suspected commission of any offense or

46. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 46 U.S. 71, 85 (1988) (upholding award
of $20,000 in compensatory damages and $1.6 million in punitive damages for a successful bad
faith breach of contract claim, due to the company's refusal to pay an insurance claim).
47. The "should" question is important because applying unsound laws to the litigation
context makes no sense. Unsound laws should be rooted out where they exist, not transferred to a
new environment.
48. when I say "are treated" I do not mean to suggest that there are many cases actually
applying the laws I will discuss. By definition, contracts to keep secrets are not likely to be
discovered and are thus unlikely to end up the subject of court opinions. What I mean when I say
"are treated" is that the law on our books and the principles behind those laws condemn such
contracts, which may be assumed to have some deterrent effect on their formation.
49. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 65-66 (critiquing the approach in the SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supranote 44).
50. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.2 (1980) (making it a misdemeanor to alter an object
"so that it appears to have value because of antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it does not
possess"); id. § 224.4 (making it a misdemeanor if a person "falsifies, destroys, removes, or
conceals any writing or record, with purpose to deceive or injure anyone or to conceal any
wrongdoing").
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information relating to an offense." It is a misdemeanor.5' In settling
lawsuits and in agreeing to keep discovery secrets, many parties, and
their lawyers, enter into agreements that seem to fall squarely within the
definition just given. However, the Model Penal Code includes an
exemption. The exception allows victims of a crime to promise not to
report the crime in exchange for reasonable compensation for the harm
caused by the criminal.52 Although this seems to exempt all agreements
connected to litigation that this Article is designed to address, that may
be too hasty a judgment.
The Comments to the Model Penal Code explain the exemption by
noting that it is not criminal to fail to report a crime out of affection or
indifference, and the victim who fails to report because his loss has been
made good, seems no more derelict in his societal duty than those who
fail to report for other reasons.53 I interpret this to mean that the law is
not trying to eradicate receiving restitution from criminals, but instead is
trying to eradicate receiving pecuniary gain for not reporting the crime.
This is a sensible distinction. The idea seems to be that as long as the
victim is being paid for the harm, as opposed to being paid for failing to
talk, there is no crime.
Now, as we sophisticates all know, it is well nigh impossible to
prove, discern, or even to speak sensibly about what portion of money
paid by a criminal to a victim may be for compensation as opposed to
silence (when the victim fails to report the crime), as long as the amount
of money paid to the victim is "reasonable compensation."" We all
know that the absence of an explicit "silence" term doesn't necessarily
mean there wasn't a silence bargain of some sort. Moreover, "reasonable
compensation" is also a relatively elastic concept. Yet, despite all of
these problems, the drafters of the Model Penal Code and the state
legislatures that followed them did not simply exempt victims of crime
from the crime of compounding. They allowed for the possibility that
victims could be prosecuted for receiving a monetary bonus in exchange
for agreeing not to report a crime to the authorities. Taking into
consideration all of the difficulties of proof, the drafters must have
thought the danger in openly endorsing such deals between victims and
criminals was serious enough to do something to discourage such deals,

51. See id. § 242.5; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.14
(West 2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.45 (Consol. 2000).
52. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 cmt. 1.
53. See id. cmt. 3.
54. See id.
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i.e., the inclusion of the words "reasonable compensation."55 They were
right. 6 Shortly I will get to why, but there are other matters to cover
first.
A good deal of the breadth in the exception to the crime of
compounding comes from the elasticity in the concept of "reasonable
compensation." While the concept and the exception may be elastic, I do
not believe it is a boundless elasticity. Consider A, a victim, who accepts
payment from X, a criminal, in exchange for a promise to keep quiet
about crimes committed by X against B, C, and D, in addition to the
crime X committed against A. I submit that such an agreement does not
fit naturally within the exception or the Comment's explanation of the
exception. Yet, these are precisely the settlement agreements that
defendants are most interested in making and which cause the greatest
harm to the public.
Moving away from criminal law for the moment, although we will
return to it, and looking instead at contract law, the Restatement (First)
of Contracts ("First Restatement") was unambiguous on the
unenforceability of contracts that trade silence about crimes for
monetary or other pecuniary benefit." Such contracts were considered
unenforceable, void as against public policy. 8 In lay terms: not worth the
paper they were written on. In addition, no exception was made for
victims of crime who, according to the First Restatement, were free to
settle civil claims arising out of acts that were crimes as well as torts, 9
but any such settlement that included a promise to conceal or compound
the offense was unenforceable.6 Williston6 ' and Corbin62 both agreed
with this approach. Williston even went so far as to note that any bargain
to conceal a crime is unlawful even if "no crime in fact has been

55. Indeed, it can be argued that the exception goes too far in that it seems to condone explicit
agreements for silence connected to the exchange of "reasonable compensation," leaving too much
room for buying silence. It may well be that any overbreadth in the exception was a bow to the
ubiquitous process of settling lawsuits for such promises, although I do not know that to be true. If
the exception's scope is connected to settlement agreements, notice that the litigators did not gain a
complete exemption from the criminal law.
56. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
57. RESTATErMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRACrs § 548(1) (1932) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT].

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. § 548 cmt. a.
See id. § 548(2).
See id § 548 cmt. a, illus. 1.
See 6 SAMUELWILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1738 (rev. ed. 1938).
See 6A ARTHuR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1430 (1962).
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committed." 63 This I will argue presently is a wise approach, but there is
more law to get on the table before we get to that.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"),
unlike its predecessor, is elusive on the topic of contracts to conceal
crimes. It does not abandon the approach found in the First Restatement
but it does not quite restate it either.64 The Second Restatement refers the
reader to the Model Penal Code's provision on compounding, which I
discussed above. 6 This, of course, suggests that contracts to conceal
crimes are not just unenforceable, as the First Restatement said, but
criminal as well. But the Second Restatement is nonetheless ambiguous.
Why was the First Restatement's provision not repeated? And more
important, did the drafters intend to engraft the Model Penal Code's
exception for victims of crimes into the law of contracts? The result is
that it is unclear whether contract law, according to the drafters of the
Second Restatement, does or should continue to treat as unenforceable a
contract that pays a victim of a crime "reasonable compensation" in
exchange for silence. Are victims who make such bargains exempt from
the crime of compounding but subject to a claim of damages for breach
of contract, if they take the money and report the crime to the police?
We are not told. Moreover, the opaqueness of the Second Restatement
also leaves us with no clear statement on the matter I raised above: the
inapplicability of the Model Penal Code exception to contracts calling
for victim A to keep silent about crimes against victims B, C, and D. I
attribute the wishy-washiness of the Second Restatement to the
increasingly common practice of settling lawsuits in exchange for
silence-a practice that I suspect the members of the American Law
Institute ("ALI"), with their insider's perspective on the functionality of
such agreements, were loathe to condemn despite contract law's general
and longstanding prohibition against bargains to conceal crimes.
Staying with contract law, what about contracts to conceal torts?
Neither the First nor the Second Restatement specifically addresses such
contracts, 66 an omission I attribute again to the failure of the drafters to
rethink the ubiquitous practice of including promises of silence in
settlement agreements and the ALI's insider bias. However, contract
law, including its codification in the Restatements, does speak to related
matters. For example, a contract to commit a tort is unenforceable as

63.
64.
65.
66.

6 WILLISTON, supranote 61, § 1718, at 4857.
See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, ch. 8, introductory note.
See id.
See Garfield, supranote 42, at 294-95.
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against public policy.67 That prohibition includes contracts to conceal
information, when concealing that information is the heart of a fraud that
one of the two contracting parties is committing or about to commit.6
More interesting, a contract to conceal information from a third party
may be unenforceable even when the concealment is not itself
fraudulent. 9 According to Corbin, even when there is no public or
private duty to disclose certain facts, a bargain not to disclose the facts is
illegal if its purpose is to bring off a profitable sale of shares or other
property by one of the two parties to the silence bargain. 7' As this point
may be difficult to grasp at first, let me provide the example used in the
first Restatement to illustrate the kind of bargain Corbin had in mind: A
wants to buy land from B at a low price. C is aware of facts, which, if
told to B, would make B demand a much higher price. A promises C
$500 for C's promise not to tell B the crucial facts. C does not tell B.
The agreement is illegal."
This example may sound surprising to some of you. It may, on first
reflection, seem wrong to say that C cannot contract to do something
that she has a perfect right to do (i.e., keep her mouth shut and tell B
nothing). Moreover, I think it may be particularly difficult for modem
lawyers to accept this illustration as sensible, precisely because it is so
analogous to the kind of agreements that plaintiffs make everyday in
settling tort suits. Plaintiffs agree for pecuniary benefit to keep quiet
about something that they have a perfect right to keep quiet about (i.e.,
no legal duty to reveal), and about which the defendant may also have a
perfect right not to disclose (although that is not always true).
Does the law really treat such bargains as unenforceable? Did it
ever? If either is so, is that crazy?
Let's return to the criminal law as a way to unravel the
Restatement's perhaps puzzling example. Compounding is a mere
misdemeanor, 72 a minor crime. Blackmail, its big cousin, is a felony, a
much more serious offense. 73 What is blackmail? The paradigmatic case
of blackmail involves a threat by A, that A will disclose something about
B that A has a perfect right to disclose, unless B pays A money to keep
quiet. Much ink has been spilled in academic journals and books trying

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 325.
See id
See 6 WILLISTON, supra note 61, § 1738.
See 6A CORBIN, supranote 62, § 1455.
See FIRST RESTATEMNENT, supranote 57, § 577, illus. 4.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (1980).
See 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1994).
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to explain the supposed paradox of blackmail:7 4 Why is it criminal for A
to bargain with B to do something A has a perfect right to do absent a
payment of money (i.e., talk or remain silent about B's affairs)?
If A can either talk or keep quiet as he chooses, why shouldn't he be
free to offer to sell his silence to B for money? A variety of explanations
for this paradox have been offered. First, note that scholars from both the
right and the left, however different their reasons are, tend to agree that
blackmail is bad and should remain a serious crime. Moreover, this view
is shared by scholars representing a wide variety of jurisprudential
views, ranging from those who use the tools of philosophy to analyze
law, like Leo Katz, 75 to those who are adherents and major players in the
law and economics movement, such as Richard Epstein 76 and Judge
Richard Posner.
Of the various solutions to the so-called paradox of blackmail, the
most telling for present purposes is one offered by Richard Epstein in an
article aptly titled, Blackmail, Inc. 7 Epstein argued that a regime in
which blackmail were legal would be seriously inefficient, wasteful, and
bad, because such a regime would encourage institutions to spring up
whose sole purpose was the collecting of information about people that
those people wanted to keep private,79 these institutions are the
Blackmail Incs. of his title. Blackmail, Inc. would collect information
with no other purpose than to suppress that information for money."'
Such an institution would produce no social benefit, but would impose
substantial costs. The costs, according to Epstein include: significant and
expanded encroachments on the privacy of individuals and entities, and
significant expenditures on security measures to prevent those
intrusions.8 ' Epstein also predicts that such institutions would increase
crime rates as people would found themselves in need of money to pay
off the blackmailers and might be driven to crime to get that money. 82
I agree that legalizing blackmail would increase the crime rate, but
unlike Epstein, I would predict a rise in homicide rates, not property
74. See generally Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (1993). See also sources cited infra notes 75-77.
75. See generally LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996).
76. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983).
77. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
78. Epstein, supra note 76.
79. See id. at 562-63.
80. See id.
81. Seeid. at564.
82. See id.
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crimes." Because the blackmail victim has no way to enforce the
contract without revealing the secrets she is paying to keep private, it is
reasonable for her to fear that the blackmailers will keep coming back
for more money. Moreover, I am unconvinced that any reputational
concerns of blackmailers would cause them to keep promises, because
the victim cannot choose to do business with only those blackmailers
with "good" reputations for keeping their word. Blackmail just doesn't
work that way. The Blackmailer chooses his "customer"-not the other
way around. Thus, I believe that killing the blackmailer would remain
the one good solution to the victim's enforcement problem.
To minimize the threat of homicide, blackmailers (in a regime
making their conduct legal) might set up institutions, just like the
institutions Epstein describes. A person can be killed; it is harder to stop
an institution. On the other hand, institutions can be bombed and burned,
and their agents eliminated. In other words, violent crime might still
work. Moreover, minimizing the risk of homicide by replacing
individual blackmailers with institutions might not be as easy as it
sounds. Blackmail institutions might be plagued by particularly serious
agency problems, such as freelancing, side deals, and skimming off
payments. The extreme price elasticity of the product being sold, silence,
would make these agency problems particularly difficult to control. The
threat of those serious agency problems might effectively limit the size
of blackmail organizations, which in turn would diminish the protection
from homicide that the institutional structure might otherwise provide.
Of course, the question of whether or how the crime rate might
increase is tangential to our main focus: Why it is wise for the law to
prohibit certain contracts for silence. Even without any increase in crime
rates, I believe Epstein's argument about the inefficiency of
institutionalized blackmail is unassailable. If Epstein is right, we have to
ask whether the willingness of courts to accept, and enforce, litigationrelated agreements that compensate people in part for keeping quiet
about information that they would otherwise be free to speak about (or
not, as they choose) transforms litigation into precisely the kind of
institution from which our blackmail laws are designed to save us-an

83. Epstein may be right that property crimes would rise too, but I would think that most
blackmail enterprises would target those who could afford to pay and leave "poor risks" free to keep
their dirty (or not so dirty) secrets. Perhaps, some low-rent, fly-by-night enterprises would arise to
plague middle- and lower-class folks who would then have to resort to crime to pay off these
companies and perhaps the wealthy would be so besieged by blackmail threats that they too would
have to commit crimes to pay off their blackmailers. I am just not as convinced of all that as I am of
the increased risk of homicide that I describe in the text.
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institution that is wasteful, that needlessly encroaches on privacy, and
that encourages wasteful expenditures to protect truly private matters
and (even more costly) matters that society has a great interest in
bringing to light.
This interest, the interest in discouraging wasteful institutions,
supports our blackmail laws, explains why "compounding" is a sensible
crime to keep on our books and justifies reading the exception to the
crime of compounding narrowly. Indeed, Epstein's argument may
support narrowing, or even eliminating, the exception to the crime of
compounding to make it clear that any explicit promise of silence about
criminal conduct is a crime itself. Epstein's argument also supports the
First Restatement's blanket condemnation of contracts to conceal
crimes. 84
Blackmail law has more to teach us. Thus far, I have been
concentrating on agreements to keep silent about criminal and tortious
conduct, not agreements to keep quiet about trade secrets or matters
traditionally considered part of an individual's legitimate zone of
privacy. It is important to note that blackmail that involves payment in
exchange for silence about criminal or tortious conduct is more wasteful
and socially harmful than blackmail about more benign information,
such as embarrassing personal information or blackmail that threatens a
company's competitive advantage by threatening the disclosure of a
trade secret. While the preceding statement needs little elaboration, one
aspect of the increased cost may not immediately spring to mind.
V.

AN INTERLUDE ON MORE DISTANT RELATIVES: CONSPIRACY AND
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Consider the crime of conspiracy. The illegal act in a conspiracy is
the agreement to accomplish an illegal act or to accomplish a legal act
through illegal means. 5 The agreement is punished as an offense
separate from the crime that is the agreement's subject. 6 The reason the
agreement is punished separately and severely (conspiracy, like

84. See Epstein, supranote 76, at 560.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2 (West 1995); Wyo. STAT.

ANN. § 6-1-303 (Michie 2001).
86. See, e.g., Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 235 (Wyo. 1993) ("All that is necessary to prove a
primafacie case of conspiracy is any overt act that establishes the agreement was acted upon in
some way. Thus, 'it is not necessary that an overt act be the substantive crime charged ....(quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957))); see also Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1946).
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blackmail, is a felony)7 is that the agreement makes it much more likely
that the criminal enterprise will succeed because two minds (as well as
four arms and four legs) are better than one (or two, in the case of
limbs)." Also, all conspiracies involve an implicit promise of silence
about the wrongs committed by one's co-conspirators, and that too
justifies treating conspiracy as a wrong separate from the underlying
offense in that such promises of secrecy increase the likelihood that the
underlying crime will go undetected, unpunished, and undeterred."
Agreements to keep criminal or tortious conduct secret that are made in
connection with litigation share at least this much in common with
conspiracy: they make it more likely that the crime or tort will go
undetected, more likely, if you will, that the criminal or tortfeasor will
be successful. This, of course, is another way of stating what I said
earlier: Blackmailing someone about a crime or tort creates greater
social harm than blackmailing someone about benign conduct. That is
not, however, to say that blackmail about benign conduct is okay.
Here, the crime of obstruction of justice is also instructive.
Obstruction of justice, also a felony," is considered a serious offense
because, by definition, it is action intended to frustrate or impede the
working of the institutions society has established to resolve disputes
(criminal wrongs or civil) peaceably.9 Now remember for purposes of
this Article I am assuming that the sole purpose of our civil court system
is the resolution of private disputes. But if, as I have argued, secrecy
agreements made in connection with litigation are akin to blackmail in
their propensity to encourage wasteful institutions, the wasteful
institution encouraged by secrecy agreements is an institution that has a
pre-existing, non-wasteful-indeed essential-purpose. The institution
that becomes the vehicle for waste is our court system when we allow it
to become the means by which it is "legal" for people to get paid for
having stumbled upon embarrassing information (whether that
information is malevolent or benign). I am saying this: The protection
we give our court system with our obstruction of justice statutes is
undermined by allowing litigation to become a bazaar for trading silence
about information. I hasten to add that I am not arguing that this trading

87. See 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903
(2001); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (Michie 2001).
88. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); Sneed v. United States, 298 F.
911,913 (5th Cir. 1924).
89. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88.
90. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-18.
91. See Sneed, 298 F. at 912.
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is obstruction of justice; it isn't. I am not arguing that this trading should
be treated as a felony as blackmail, conspiracy and obstruction of justice
are.
What I have argued thus far is that the conduct we so readily
accept, trading secrecy in settlement agreements, may amount to the
misdemeanor of compounding, a crime now on our books.
Understanding how startling a notion that must be and how difficult
many will find it to reimagine as criminal (or even a civil wrong that
would render a contract void) something so seemingly "legal" as the
practice of trading secrecy while settling a lawsuit, I have tried to
explain how these commonplace agreements are first cousins to the
felony of blackmail, second cousins to the felony of conspiracy, and
distant relatives to the felony of obstruction of justice.
We want to enforce and encourage them for what reason? To clear
court dockets, encourage settlements, and discourage trials? Fostering
settlements at any price makes little to no sense, particularly when the
device used to foster those settlements might well be responsible in the
first place for there being a lawsuit that needs to be settled. To elaborate
that point, we must return to the topic that led me to the digression on
conspiracy and obstruction of justice: the wrong of secrecy agreements
that do not involve concealing crimes or torts.
VI.

AGREEMENTS TO KEEP SECRET BENIGN INFORMATION: TRADE
AND INTIMATE SECRETS

Agreements to keep secret the fruits of discovery, entered into
during discovery as well as pursuant to settlement, protect much more
than information about crimes and torts. They also and often protect
legitimate trade secrets 92 of businesses and legitimate privacy rights93 of
ordinary people. Discovery is so open and wide-ranging (nearly
unlimited in scope, according to the prosecrecy advocates), 94 that some
argue that private agreements to keep matters secret are essential to
maintaining the competitive position of American business and the
ordinary privacy interests of those who seek redress for wrongs in our
courts 95
.

To understand the flaw in that argument for secrecy agreements,
one must note that the argument is based on an unspoken assumption
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Marcus, supra note 21, at 488-93; Miller, supra note 4, at 433-34.
See Marcus, supra note 21, at 486; Miller, supra note 4, at 464-67.
See Miller, supra note 4, at 440.
See id. at 475.
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that is seriously flawed: that the information gleaned in discovery should
be treated as an asset of the party who makes the discovery request, an
asset that that party then has the right to sell back to the party from
whom it was elicited. The information that is being sold in settlements
that promise secrecy is information that came into the plaintiff's (or
defendant's hands) incidentally. That is, the would-be seller of secrecy
acquired the information she is now trading upon as an incident to a
process that exists so that she and others can peaceably resolve
legitimate, or even colorable, legal claims-the claims that supported the
underlying litigation. Does it make sense to treat this byproduct of
litigation as an asset
that a party obtains apart from the merits of the
96
claim?
underlying
My answer is that it does not. First, let us assume that it is the
plaintiff who is selling back to the defendant the right to keep
information to itself, or more accurately, secure from the threat that the
plaintiff will disclose the information." Although it sometimes is the
defendant who is selling silence, for simplicity's sake I will assume here
that it is the plaintiff, which is often the case. Giving plaintiffs an asset
to sell, or a good chance of securing such an asset, for the mere price of
filing suit, creates perverse incentives to file suits. In concrete terms that
is what Epstein's blackmail argument means in this context.
As important, and perhaps more important, allowing plaintiffs to
treat as an asset information gleaned as a byproduct of litigation
undercuts the efficiency of tort law, employment law, and every other
kind of law that allows private causes of action. It overcompensates
victims and sometimes compensates those who have not been victimized
at all. When it is the defendant who gains information to sell back to the
plaintiff, it undercuts the efficiency of law by undercompensating

96. It is precisely because I have framed the question this way that my analysis does not reach
the question of keeping the amount of the settlement secret. See supra footnote 41 (explaining that
this Article would not reach that question). The amount of the settlement is a byproduct of litigation,
but access to the information is not. It is information that may be said to belong jointly to both
parties in a way that discovery information does not-because it is jointly created by them (and
does not pre-exist the dispute in any form). Discovery information, in contrast, preexists (in some
form) the lawsuit and "belongs" to one party and not the other. The discoverer is provided access to
it through compulsory court process solely for the purpose of asserting a claim, not for sale. It is for
those reasons that I call it a byproduct of litigation and maintain that it is a byproduct that should be
distinguished from the settlement amount, a different sort of "byproduct."
97. I say "more accurately" because if plaintiff A got the material through discovery, one may
readily imagine that plaintiffs B, C, and so on, may also have a right to receive this information in
the discovery process. Moreover, the information may be information that the defendant has no
right to keep secret, e.g., some law may require that the information be disclosed to a government
agency.
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victims who presumably pay defendants for keeping plaintiffs' secrets
by accepting smaller settlements than they would otherwise demand or
by dropping their lawsuit altogether to buy back their privacy. Creating
perverse incentives to file suit is bad, as is distorting settlement amounts
by allowing the sale of the information that is a byproduct of having
filed suit. To do this in the name of resolving lawsuits efficiently is
illogical, to put it mildly. The raison d'etre of courts cannot be to settle
disputes that exist only because the law allows parties access to
information when they sue and then allows them to sell it.
VII.

SUGGESTIONS ON REFORM

So how would I protect the legitimate interest that parties might
have in keeping trade secrets, and private information, private? Trade
secrets (read broadly) and private information of the sort traditionally
treated as private by tort and other law should remain in the control of
the party who is forced to reveal it in discovery. In other words, the party
producing the information should retain whatever legitimate rights he or
she had prior to its production to keep the information secret.
As things stand now, given our strong commitment to public trials,
I see no way to avoid this hard reality: Going to trial will always involve
some cost to legitimate privacy interests. That means that people and
entities will still have an incentive to settle, created by the desire for
secrecy, when the other side's claims are only weakly supported by
evidence. Public trials also mean that settlement amounts will be skewed
because some legitimate secrets, whether trade or intimate, may be kept
only by settling. At least that will be true as long as that information is
otherwise admissible at trial, unless we make it easier for courts to close
trials when such information is introduced-an option that might be too
costly to other important values served by public trials. However, our
inability to avoid that reality does not excuse us from fixing what we
can.
Accepting the prosecrecy supporters' understanding of the role of
courts, i.e., that they exist to resolve private disputes, a party should
have to do nothing more than identify the alleged trade secret or private
information to a judge or magistrate to obtain a court order protecting
the information from disclosure. To minimize the incentive to file
frivolous objections to such designations and thereby minimize payoffs
that might be made to avoid those objections, heavy fines should be
imposed on parties who file frivolous objections to requests for
protective orders. Moreover, lawyers should have to affirm to the court,
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on penalty of being held in contempt, that no agreement has been struck
to avoid the filing of objections. This would help avoid collusion that
might otherwise occur between parties: payoffs to get the opposing party
to agree to a protective order for trade secrets or other legitimately
private information.
The judge or magistrate should make an in camera examination of
the designated material. If it is found to be a trade secret or information
traditionally considered private under our laws, the magistrate should
issue a protective order preventing the other party from disclosing the
information prior to trial. In addition, parties should not be allowed to
refer to such material in open court without first securing a ruling that
the evidence is admissible.
The plaintiff should not be able to make the defendant pay to keep
legitimate secrets hidden nor should a defendant be able to discourage
plaintiffs from pursuing their claims with the threat that it may reveal
private information about the plaintiff, if the plaintiff pursues his case or
insists on reasonable compensation. The law should do what it can to
minimize these risks, by making it easy for a party to obtain court
ordered protection for legitimate secrets and penalizing both parties, as
well as their lawyers, for entering into private deals to protect that same
information.
As for illegitimate secrets, agreements to keep secret material
indicating the existence of a public danger (whether past, present, or
future) should be illegal. 93 Public danger, as I am using that term,
includes torts as well as crimes, negligent conduct, and intentional
wrongs. Moreover, by "illegal" I mean more than merely unenforceable.
I do not believe it is enough to make such agreements unenforceable.
My argument suggests that such agreements are sufficiently harmful and
create perverse enough incentives for the law to do all it can to ensure
they are not made. Merely rendering them unenforceable in court is
simply not enough. Parties could work around that too easily, by
providing for payments over time to ensure that the party promising
silence kept her bargain without a court's intervention. Also, third
parties might never learn of the agreement in order to bring a third party
challenge, although I believe the law should allow such challenges and
indeed encourage them by providing that the parties to any such
agreement must pay a substantial sum to the third party challenger.
98. I recognize the drafting problems inherent in defining how "indicative" of a tort or crime
the information must be to trigger the restrictions and fines I suggest in this Part, but those problems
are not insurmountable. Statutes now exist that do a fairly good job at delineating the information I
have in mind here. Cf. Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (vest Supp. 2002).
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However, even that is not enough. Since those contracts involve secrecy,
they might not be discovered by a third party. In order to deter the
making of such agreements, the law should go further and provide
sanctions: civil or criminal fines of substantial amounts. Considering the
likelihood that the agreement will go undetected, substantial fines would
be necessary to create an adequate disincentive to the creation of these
bargains.
What about all those hard cases where the information at issue
involves a danger to the public and also implicates valuable trade
secrets? Again, because I would outlaw private agreements about either
type of information, this problem is not as great as it might first appear.
Courts would have to decide whether the danger or potential danger to
the public outweighs the claim that privacy as to the information is a
party's right. To discourage either party from lightly asserting that both
interests are present, frivolous arguments of this type should also be
heavily sanctioned. Moreover, whenever a party makes such a claim, the
judge should have to write an opinion detailing the evidence presented to
justify any decision to keep the information quiet, and the fact that such
a decision has been rendered should be made public, so that third parties
can be alerted to the possibility that the ruling was in part a product of
collusion between the parties, which the judge did not discern. Such
collusion would be an illegal agreement that would trigger the fines and
payment to successful third party challengers, as I described above.
VIII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ETHICS OF LAWYERS, PARTIES,
AND LEGAL INSIDERS, SUCH AS OURSELVES

In concluding, I wish to return to an issue raised in my introduction,
but not addressed explicitly as of yet: should the ethics codes applaud,
encourage, and allow, as all seem to agree they do, what I have argued
the law, at least, as written in books, seems to prohibit and should
prohibit. Further, do those rules really now allow what the law (even in
books) does not? The latter question cannot be answered without taking
a position on whether something that seems illegal under any sensible
reading of a statute is illegal when no court or government agent is
prepared to act as if it were. One's answer to that question depends on
one's jurisprudential stance. In other words, I do not believe that there is
a right and a wrong answer to the question of whether something courts
assume is legal, is. It really depends on what you think "law" is. That
makes the question about the ethics rules hard, if not impossible, to
answer. To a large extent the ethics rules piggyback on the law. Simply
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put, to say whether the ethics rules make it "unethical" for a lawyer to
promise secrecy in exchange for a good settlement of her client's case
depends on whether such deals are legal or illegal under other law.
Moreover, just as one's jurisprudential view determines one's answer to
whether an unenforced law remains law, one's jurisprudential view
determines whether something is "unethical" that courts and lawyers
alike insist on treating as ethical. Thus, we have a double conundrum.
What everyone has assumed is an easy question is not so easy after all.
There is no simple answer to the question of whether the ethics rules
"allow" lawyers to participate in the making of such agreements. The
simple answer persists only so long as we ignore the law, the law of
compounding, the law of contracts, and the lessons embedded in the
laws against blackmail too.
Having been unable to answer the question of what the ethics rules
currently allow, perhaps I can answer the question of what the rules
should allow. This is easier. Richard Zitrin proposed an ethics rule that
would have prohibited lawyers from entering into settlement agreements
that concealed conduct or information likely to result in loss of life or
substantial bodily harm." The Ethics 2000 Commission rejected that
proposed rule on the ground, I am told, that because it is legal for clients
to enter such agreements, it should be ethical for a lawyer to help the
client with such an agreement by drafting it and agreeing to abide by its
terms. Again, that argument assumes, without examining, that these
agreements are "lawful," a point I have tried to demonstrate is cloudier
than everyone assumes.
However, there is another point I want to make about the ethics
rules. The ABA has given approval to a proposal the Ethics 2000
Commission made, which I believe changes the analysis of what the
ethics rules say about some of the agreements I've been criticizing
here,"°0 although neither the ABA House of Delegates nor the
Commission was thinking about these agreements when they passed the
amendment to the ethics rules to which I refer. °' The new amendment
changes the rule on confidentiality to give lawyers discretion to disclose
99. See ZrrRIN, supra note 34, app. A; Mark Hansen, And Now the Feedback: Proposed
Model Rules ChangesDraw Plenty of Comments, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 88, 88.
100. See COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, ABA, REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 42 (2001) (R. 1.6), available at

http:llwww.abaneLorg/cpr/e2k-wholerpt.doe (last visited Mar. 22, 2002); see also Ethics 2000:
February2002 Report, at http:llwww.abanet.org/cpre/e2k-202reporLsunm.html (last visited Mar.
20,2002).
101. Mark Hansen, Let the Debate Begin: Report on ABA Ethics Rules is Ready for the House,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 80, 80.
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information
about any act likely to result in death or substantial bodily
2
injury.
If adopted as law in any state, I believe that exception would make
it unethical (by which I mean, it should be interpreted to make it
unethical) for a lawyer to enter into an agreement (with his client or the
opposing party or any third party for that matter) not to disclose any
information that might reasonably protect a third party's life or body.
Any discretion given a lawyer by the ethics rules for the purpose of
protecting the courts, third parties, or society as a whole should not be
available as an asset for the lawyer to trade away for her own pecuniary
benefit or that of her client. Reading the ethics code to allow lawyers to
trade any such discretion given by any of the ethics rules makes
103
no sense.
First, as my colleague George Cohen put it when I discussed this
with him, if lawyers could trade away the exceptions to client
confidentiality designed to protect courts or third parties, clients would
be justified in suspecting that we wrote these exceptions into the rule on
confidentiality for the purpose of jacking up our fees, thereby creating
assets we could sell away. The same could, of course, be said about any
discretion given lawyers under other ethics rules, i.e., was it written in to
provide us with an asset to sell to clients who wanted a different variety
of "professional." Second, if the point of giving the lawyer discretion
under any particular ethics rule is to encourage lawyers to consider
interests other than their clients, it would seem inconsistent to read this
rule as allowing lawyers to sell that discretion to one's client or to
anyone for monetary gain. Therefore, it is my position that the sensible
way to read the ABA's new amendment to the confidentiality rule is that
it would be unethical for a lawyer to participate in drafting or being a
party to any agreement that binds the lawyer to conceal information that
might protect third parties from serious physical harm or death if
revealed. The discretion to protect third parties from such harm, given to
lawyers by the ethics rules, has not been given to help lawyers make
money nor to help them get their clients bigger settlements.

102. See id.
103. A number of rules provide lawyers with discretion to be exercised against the client's
interests in favor of the court's interests or the interests of a third party. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2001) (giving the lawyer discretion to reveal to the court the lawyer's
suspicion that false evidence has been offered); id. R. 1.16(b)(1) (giving the lawyer discretion to
withdraw if she reasonably believes, but does not clearly know, that the client is using her services
to commit a fraud or crime). But cf. id. R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring withdrawal when the lawyer is
sure).
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Finally, as should be clear by now, I believe that it is wrong for
lawyers to agree to keep information about crimes or torts secret for
pecuniary benefit even when life and limb are not at stake. I agree with
Richard Zitrin that the ethics rules should condemn and punish that
wrong. However, I believe that it is even more important for other law to
address and outlaw these agreements.
The reason I think other law needs to outlaw these agreements is
that our world is made more dangerous and otherwise impoverished by
these agreements whether the agreement is made by a lawyer or layman,
an individual or a corporation. If plaintiffs' lawyers must bear some
responsibility for the deaths and injuries that might not have occurred
but for the secrecy agreements they signed and abided by, they are not
alone. The defendant's lawyers are also to blame. Firestone's already
considerable blameworthiness and Ford's is increased by the
participation of these two corporations in agreements to keep
information from the public that might have prevented serious harm. The
injured plaintiffs and their families are also to blame.
Finally, you and I, we too must bear some blame-we, insiders,
who too readily accept the status quo. We, who might make a difference,
by raising our voices, we too are partially to blame. People are dead
because of practices we condone; practices that serve no legitimate
principles; practices that not only risk life and limb but which distort our
judicial process, produce perverse incentives, and threaten legitimate
secrets as well. It is time we looked anew at what we have accepted for
too long. Complacency can be costly too.'0 4

104. The secrecy continues, even in cases involving Firestone's tires and Ford's SUVs. See
discussion supranote 4 (describing the ruling of the Indiana district court handling the multidistrict
litigation on these tires that upholds the "private" secrecy agreement). See also Chi. Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1305, 1307-09 (11th Cir. 2001) (vacating and
remanding a decision of the district court that would have lifted a protective order entered by a court
pursuant to a stipulation entered by the parties in connection with settling a lawsuit brought by the
parents of an eighteen-year old who had died in a roll-over car accident allegedly caused by faulty
Firestone tires on the ground that the district court had required that the continued secrecy be
justified by some compelling reason when any good cause would do).
Finally, this Article was written prior to all the horrific disclosures about priests molesting
minors and the Church covering up those wrongs. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 26; Wakin, supra
note 26. Secrecy provisions in settlements played an important part in the Church's efforts to
conceal these wrongs and thus contributed in some measure to the victimization of more children.
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